With the increasing deployment of GPUs in many domains, it is important to enhance the dependability of GPU-based systems especially in mission critical environments. We believe that undefined behaviors present a major challenge for the CUDA platform, because its programming language and compiler are derived from traditional C/C++ languages. In this paper, we first present a suite of benchmarks for CUDA, which contains 77 categories of undefined behaviors corresponding to the core language in C11 standard. It is developed to evaluate how current CUDA compilers deal with undefined behaviors. Then, we present the design and implementation of a system that can detect and locate vulnerable code that may result in undefined behaviors in CUDA programs. Our system is composed of a program converter and a static analyzer; the former transforms CUDA programs into a portable and semantic-reserved C/C++ programs, and the latter performs analysis on the transformed programs to statically identify undefined behaviors. Using CUDA SDK and a set of real CUDA applications, we conduct extensive experiments to investigate the effectiveness of our system on finding undefined behaviors in CUDA C programs.
I. INTRODUCTION
CUDA (Compute Unified Device Architecture) is a widely-used platform that eases the programming of GPUs for general-purpose parallel computing. The CUDA framework offers a C-like development environment, which greatly reduces the difficulties in developing parallel applications, However, the CUDA platform inevitably inherits some problems in C such as undefined behaviors [1] , which brings new challenges to GPU programming.
In computer programming, undefined behaviors refer to unpredictable behaviors that a specific piece of code may produce. This is a feature of some programming languages, especially the C language [2] . According to the C11 Standard [7] , Annex J, J.2 [3] outlines 203 cases of undefined behaviors, and offers C-family compilers the freedom to deal with the issues in their own way for those cases. However, because the C standard presumes the program never invokes undefined behaviors, so the way that C-family compilers exploit undefined behaviors is to optimize a program under this assumption. This always results in consequences that are often counterintuitive, for example, a program works well with common optimizations (e.g., −O0), but breaks at higher optimization levels (e.g., −O2). Compilers may discard some The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jiafeng Xie.
code fragments that are treated as dead code that we call vulnerable code. To understand vulnerable code, see the example of pointer overflows check shown in the above code snippet. The variable buf is a pointer and len is a positive integer. The programmer's original purpose is to catch the case when len is too large so that the result of buf + len wraps around and bypasses the first check. Because the C standard states that the behavior of an overflowed pointer is undefined [2] , thus a compiler may simply assume that no pointer overflow occurs on any architecture. Under this assumption, the compiler considers that the result of buf + len must be larger than buf, and the overflow checking usually evaluates to false. Consequently, the compilers remove the check by default, resulting in a vulnerability [4] . This paper is inspired by the work [5] , which presents a systematic approach to reasoning about and detecting unstable code in C, and shows that unstable code is present in many real systems. With the increasing deployment of GPUs VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ TABLE 1. The list of sufficient (though not necessary) conditions for undefined behaviors in certain CUDA C constructs. Here p is a n-bit pointers; x, y are n-bit integers; a[] is an array, its capacity is denoted as sizeof(a); op refers to binary operators +, −, *, /, % over signed integers; NULL is the null pointer.
in mission critical environments, it is important to enhance the dependability of these GPU-based systems. We believe undefined behaviors present a major challenge for the CUDA platform, because its programming language and compiler is a natural extension of traditional C/C++ languages. However, no study has been conducted to analyze such issues, and no practical systems has been proposed to detect undefined behaviors in CUDA applications. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work aiming at the evaluation of undefinedness presented in CUDA compilers and detection of undefined behaviors in CUDA applications.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We develop a suite of benchmarks for CUDA, which contains 77 categories of undefined behaviors corresponding to the core language in C11 standard. An extensive study on the undefinedness of CUDA C and how CUDA compilers deal with it is presented.
• We present the design and implementation of a system that can be used to identify vulnerable code in CUDA C. This system has been used to find 21 undefined behaviors in a wide range of CUDA applications, including division by zero, oversized shift, null pointer dereference, signed integer overflow, and out-of-range pointer.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the background about undefined behaviors. Section III presents representative examples in our specifically-designed benchmark. How complier optimizations affect undefined behaviors is given in Section IV. We present the challenges of detecting the undefined behaviors in CUDA in Section V. Section VI introduces the design and implementation of a system that is capable of detecting undefined behaviors in CUDA. Section VII reports the results by applying our system to real CUDA applications. Section VIII discusses the related work, and we conclude this paper in Section IX.
II. UNDEFINED BEHAVIORS
According to C standard [2] , undefined behavior is defined as ''Behavior, upon use of a nonportable or erroneous program construct or of erroneous data, for which the C Standard imposes no requirements''. In C/C++, in order to simplify the standard and offer some flexibility to the implementation of program, the standard specifies that the results of certain operations are undefined. Table 1 shows a list of constructs and their undefined behavior conditions, as specified in C standard [1] . We divide the undefined behaviors into two categories. One class includes errors that programmers make when writing code, such as buffer overflows and null pointers. The other class contains errors caused by non-portable operations. The same code will have different results if it is run on different hardware platforms. Consider such a code snippet int x = 1; return x / 0. When executing on PowerPC and x86 [6] , it will produce different results (0 on PowePC and 1 on x86). Running the same program on different bits of hardware on the same platform will also produce different results, such as respectively performing shift operations on 32-bit and 64-bit x86.
Because the C standard presumes that developers does not write program that contains undefined behaviors, so compilers have the freedom to generate instructions that behave in arbitrary ways to deal with these undefined behaviors. This may result in the target program producing different results when compiled with different compilers. To avoid these problems, it is necessary for the programmer to find undefined behaviors and insert corresponding constraints. For example, NULL pointer reference and out-of-bound array accesses are common errors in C applications, in order to eliminate the sources of such undefined behaviors, each array accesses needs to be checked, and the ABI (Application Binary Interface) needs to be changed to ensure that any pointer arithmetic operation is accompanied by range information.
III. CASE STUDIES
In order to empirically understand undefined behaviors in CUDA, we constructed a test set containing 77 categories of undefined behaviors corresponding to the core language of C11 standard [7] , which is similar to KCC [8] . In the following, due to space constraint, we only present eight representative examples from our test set. We describe the results that programmers intend to obtain and the compiler-induced behaviors in C and CUDA. By comparing and analyzing the results of various compilers, we can determine whether different types of undefined behaviors exist in CUDA and explore how CUDA compilers deal with various undefined behaviors.
The compilers used in our study include clang 8.0 on MacOS Sierra 10.12, gcc 4.8.4, and nvcc (7.0, 7.5, 8.0) on Ubuntu 14.04. GPUs used in our experiments are Quadro P620, Quadro P4000, GeForce GTX 1070, and GeForce TitanX. In our discussion, unless otherwise stated, the defaut version of clang or gcc is 8.0 and 4.8.4 respectively.
A. DIVISION BY ZERO
In a division operation, if the value of the divisor is zero, the behavior is undefined. Consider the code snippet int x = 1; do (x = x − 1;) while (x / x ); Its intention is to signal an error when x is zero. When we use gcc and clang to compile this code, although both compilers do not throw any warnings or errors during compilation when the optimization is disabled, they produce errors when different optimization levels are enabled [9] . When we wrap this code snippet in a GPU kernel and use nvcc (7, 7.5, 8) to compile, we can observe different results. No errors or warnings are reported at any optimization levels. Unlike gcc and clang, nvcc does not check division by zero during compilation, which will result in undefined behaviors at runtime.
B. OVERSIZED SHIFTING
In C, shifting an integer by more than n bits (on a 32-bit or 64-bit system, n is 32 or 64) will cause undefined behaviors. In general, the compiler assumes that the maximum number of bits that can be shifted is n − 1. Therefore, when the number of left-shifted bits of an integer exceeds or equals to n − 1, the value is always 0. Consider this code int x = 1 << 32. Under clang and gcc, they both issue the warning ''left shift count width of type [enabled byvdefault] >='' with compiler options O0 and O1, and both output 0. Obviously, the two compilers check whether a program contains oversized shift during compilation, but they do not take any further actions [1] to deal with this problem. With level O2/O3, although gcc and clang detect the oversized shift and issue relevant information to users, they only initiate a compiler interrupt [10] to handle this undefined behavior.
To study its behavior on the GPU, we rewrite the above code in CUDA C. Like the behavior of gcc and clang at O0/O1 level, three versions of nvcc all display the warning message ''shift count is too large'' at each compilation level, and the results are all 1. This tells us that oversized shift also exists in CUDA C, but nvcc does not take any optimization measures [1] to deal with this problem, such as compiler interrupt, forced exit, deletion of dead code, and modification of variable value etc.
C. FLOAT TO INT
According the C11 standard [7] , ''When a finite value of real floating type is converted to an integer type other than 'Bool', the fractional part is discarded (i.e., the value is truncated toward zero). If the value of an integral part cannot be represented by the integer type, the behavior is undefined.'' Under this assumption, compilers always think that the converted value of a variable is always within the range that the target data type can represent. But if it is not the case, compilers would operate in any ways. Consider the above code snippet, where d is a float variable, and it is multiplied with the value 1 << 32(1073741824). The result is converted to an unsigned long integer. Obviously, its value exceeds the range of the type long. when we use clang, gcc, and nvcc to compile, they all do not throw a warning or error in both common and optimization mode, and the execution results are all uncertain, such as 0xffffffffe0000000, 0xc1c0000000000000 etc. nvcc assumes that this type of undefined behavior would not appear in programs, so it does not check this type of undefined behavior.
D. OUT-OF-RANGE POINTER
The CERT C [11] states that: ''addition or subtraction of a pointer into, or just beyond, an array object and integer type produces a result that points just beyond the array object and is used as the operand of a unary * operator that is evaluated''. Under this assumption, compilers usually assume that the value of a pointer will never be out of range. However, if it is not the case, the program's behavior is undefined. Consider the code snippet below.
i n t a [ 5 ] = { 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 } ; *(&a [ 5 ] ) ; p r i n t f ( "%d \ n " , *(&a [ 5 ] ) ) ; r e t u r n 0 ;
At the common and optimization level, clang throws out a warning 'array index 5 is past the end of the array', and the execution results are both 3276732765. gcc does not throw out any warnings or errors, and by compiling and running the code multiple times, we get different results, such as 32767, 32765, and 32764. When enabling compiler optimizations, no warning or error messages are reported. To guarantee the subscript is in bounds, the compiler needs to insert extra instructions to check if the element that the subscript expression refers to is in the same array. This runtime checking is very time consuming, thus only a few compilers do so.
We compile and run the code on GPUs using the three versions of nvcc, and can observe distinctive outcomes. First, they all do not throw out warnings or errors, and return results 1 or 0, 1 or 0, 7547722 or −167772162566178 for CUDA 7.0, 7.5, and 8.0 respectively (compilers return one of the two results randomly). Second, by enabling the compiler optimization, we observe no warnings or errors, and the running results are all 5477227744844. These unpredictable results reflect the fact that nvcc does not perform boundary checks at all compilation levels.
E. STORAGE DURATION OF OBJECTS
In C, an object in memory has its lifetime that is determined by the storage duration. The object has three kinds of storage duration: static, automatic, and allocated. If its value is automatically stored and the storage time is indeterminate, the runtime behavior will be undefined. For example, in this code fragment, x and y are both variables of type char, but if they have different types of storage duration, their storage time becomes different, so the value of z becomes unpredictable when the if statement is evaluated. In this case, all compilers do not throw out any warnings or errors, and the outputs are uncertain, such as 1, 0, etc. Thus, the ignorance of this type of undefined behavior by the compiler may result in latent bugs.
F. OBJECT DEFINED WITH VOLATILE QUALIFIED TYPE
The CERT C [11] states that: ''An attempt is made to refer to an object defined with a volatile-qualified type through the use of an lvalue with non-volatile-qualified type''. In C, ''volatile'' is a type modifier. For a volatile-qualified variable, the compiler will no longer optimize the accesses to it using registers. This feature is designed to meet the special needs of multi-threads synchronization, interrupt, and hardware design.
If the compiler wants to take a modified value, it is directly accessed from the register rather than from the memory. This compiler optimization is not a problem in single-threaded programs. But in the case where multiple threads are running concurrently, it is possible that a thread has changed a shared variable and the value of the register in other threads is outdated. If the thread itself do not know and still obtain value from the register, this will result in undefined behaviors.
v o l a t i l e i n t x = 5 ; * ( i n t *)&x ; p r i n t f ( "%d \ n " , * ( i n t *)&x ) ;
Considering the above code snippet, we can observe that clang throws out the warning ''expression result unused'' (means that the type of lvalue (int) not compatible with the effective type of the object being accessed (volatile int)), and produces 5 for one thread and some uncertain values, such as 0, for other threads. Unlike clang, gcc does not output any warnings or errors, but produces the same result. This indicates that clang checks this kind of undefined behavior for any compiling level as compared to gcc. Coverting the code to CUDA C, we can observe that the three versions of nvcc all output the warning 'expression has no effect', and produce the same results with clang and gcc in common and optimize level. Base on these results, we know that this undefined behavior also exits in CUDA C, and nvcc checks this kind of undefined behavior during compiling.
G. SUBTRACTION OF POINTERS
The C11 Standard [7] states that: ''When two pointers are subtracted, both shall point to elements of the same array object, or past the last element of the array object; the result is the difference between the subscripts of the two array elements.... If the result is not representable in an object of that type, the behavior is undefined''. We know that pointer arithmetics are permitted in C. However, pointer subtraction needs a prerequisite, which is that two pointers must point to the same array or to the first element after the last element of an array. Only under this constraint, subtraction of pointers makes sense. For an expression, if we ignore the premise of pointer arithmetic, the expression is likely to be wrong, and the error cannot be detected with compiler's syntax checking. This kind of error is difficult to debug because it may not show up consistently.
i n t a [ 3 ] ;
i n t b [ 2 ] ; &a [ 2 ] − &b [ 1 ] ; p r i n t f ( "%d \ n " , &a [ 2 ] − &b [ 1 ] ) ; r e t u r n 0 ;
As the above code fragment shows, it does not meet the prerequisite conditions of pointer addition and subtraction arithmetics, so the program would cause undefined behavior. No warnings or errors is displayed when using clang and gcc to compile the code, and the execution results are different (3 vs 5). Both compilers fail to identify this kind of undefined behavior. In comparison, nvcc behaves similarly to clang and gcc, except that the execution on GPUs produces different results (although still unpredictable, such as −2, −3). nvcc also fails to identify such undefined behavior.
H. NON-CONSTANT ARRAY SIZE
The C11 standard [7] states that: ''If the size is not an integer constant expression: if it occurs in a declaration at function prototype scope, it is treated as if it were replaced by *; otherwise, each time it is evaluated it shall have a value greater than zero.'' We know that constant expressions in C can be used to define the initial size of an array. If the declared array size is not a constant expression, then the program may produce undefined behaviors.
Consider the above code snippet. The array x is not declared with a constant expression. When compiling this code, gcc does not throw out any warnings or errors, and the output of printf is 0. Unlike gcc, clang throws out an error message ''segmentation fault : 11'' under all optimization levels. Like clang, nvcc also throw out an error message ''expression must have a constant value'' under all optimization levels. This compiling-time interrupt can effectively prevent the occurrence of undefined behaviors at runtime.
IV. COMPILER OPTIMIZATION FOR UNDEFINED BEHAVIORS
The compiler optimization can increase the impact of undefined behaviors in many situations. For example, x + 1 > x  TABLE 2 . Optimizations of vulnerable code in several popular compilers: gcc, clang and nvcc. In the table, p is a pointer, x and y is a signed integer. In each cell, ''On'' means that the specific version of the compiler optimizes the check into false and discards it at optimization level n, while ''−'' means that the compiler does not discard the check at any levels.
can be evaluated to be 1 > 0. Although it is not correct, it is often produced when the compiler processes inline code or macro expansion. Another example of important optimization is for loops [12] , such as for ( i = 0; i <= N; ++i). In this loop, the compiler can assume that the loop will exactly iterate N + 1 times if i is undefined on overflows, which makes it possible to allow various loop optimizations to intervene. If the variable is defined to wrap around on overflow, the compiler may assume that the loop would be infinite (e.g., if N is INT_MAX), this may disable important loop optimizations.
Many compilers ignore this type of overflow [13] , which can lead to error of the integer variable that is uncertain or incorrect, and ultimately cause the entire program to produce indeterminate errors. The above code snippet may have been written by many programmers, MAX_LEN is a relatively large integer, such as 32767. We know that short is a type of 16-bit, and it can represent values ranging from −32768 to 32767. However, if an overflow occurs in the while loop, the value of len may become negative, and the while loop will run infinitely. Consider another code fragment below. It is from the Linux kernel [14] . If the value of sbi− > s_log_groups_perf_lex is set to 32, then groups_perf_lex will be 0 (1 << 32). If it is used as a dividend, the program's behavior will deviate from its original intention. When gcc compiles this code fragment, it will judge the value of sbi− > s_log_groups_per_flex is less than 32, because C11 standard states that if shifting a value by more than n-bits that a larger or equal to the number of a n-bit integer will cause undefined behavior. In general, the compiler assumes that the maximum number of bits that can be shifted is n − 1. So, no matter how many bits of integer 1 are shifted, the result is always 0. In this case, the complier may think that the oversized shift checking is not necessary and can be discarded, which would result in bugs for programs that contain this kind of undefined behavior.
To gain insights into the discovery of undefined behaviors in various compilers and compare the behaviors for a specific type, we test the examples of all 77 categories of core language undefinedness appearing in the C11 standard on the CPU and GPU as presentd in Section I, where we only present 7 common types of undefined behaviors and analyze the compilation results from these tests. For each case, we test if a compiler can evaluate a corresponding expression into false. And if so, we find the lowest optimization level [15] -On (n can be 0, 1, or 2) at which it happens, as shown in Table 2 .
We can observe from Table 2 that the compilers do not perform optimizations for a considerable part of undefined behaviors, even if some of the undefined behaviors can be optimized, compiler developers would like to use the C language's undefined behavior to infer, finally this will lead the program to get strange results. The reasoning of this type of optimization process is similar, they all use a seemingly rigorous and subtle reasoning. For example, assume that a program defines an integer variable x, if x > 0, then the program will have undefined behavior, so we can conclude that the value of x must be less than or equal to 0, so now we use the fact that x 0 to optimize the relevant code. This seems reasonable, but it is incorrect. The correct one is: If x > 0, then the program will trigger undefined behavior. At this time, any behavior of the program is correct. Therefore, the optimization only needs to generate the correct optimization according to the assumption that x 0, when the optimized program happens to be at x > 0, whatever kind of behavior will be correct. In other words, the optimization only guarantees that the branch with no undefined behavior is correct, but it is not responsible for deciding whether the branch that contains undefined behaviors is ''damage'' in this process.
For the above different versions of gcc, clang, and nvcc, the discovery and processing of undefined behaviors can be roughly divided into three categories. The first is that the compiler cannot discover any undefined behaviors, and this class occupies a large part. The second is that the compiler can find undefined behaviors and throw out warnings to programmers, but does not take further optimization measures against undefined behaviors. Programmers need to locate code fragments containing undefined behaviors manually. The third is that the compiler can detect the undefined behavior and take appropriate optimization measures [15] . But this optimization is likely to cause the program to create more loopholes and ultimately lead to unpredictable results. This is a big challenge even for seasoned programmers, so it is desired to quickly and accurately locate undefined behaviors in a systematic way.
V. CHALLENGES IN DETECTING UNDEFINED BEHAVIORS FOR CUDA C
The first example in Section III shows that whether the program produces undefined behaviors or not depends on if the dividend in the loop body is zero or not, and its result in the operation of such a program is unpredictable. Due to the wide range of problems caused by undefined behaviors, even experienced developers cannot avoid it. Given that CUDA C inherits most of features of C language and the complexity of developing parallel applications, we believe that undefined behaviors may be even harder to avoid during the development of CUDA C programs.
In the previous section, we learned that CUDA compilers can discover some kinds of undefined behaviors, but when enabling optimizations, the compiler tends to increase the impact of undefined behaviors because compiler optimizations usually does not take a way to define the behaviors, which is not the correct method that programmer expects, but at most time these seemingly correct optimization strategies are employed by some compilers, making these optimizations meaningless and even the use of these optimization measures is counter-productive. Usually this situation will make programmers overwhelmed by these problems.
CUDA compiler (nvcc) does not use runtime checks like gcc and clang to defend common undefined behaviors. For example, clang provides the option −fsanitize = undefined to restrict several undefined behaviors in the compiling process, and gcc also has the option −ftrapv [9] to prevent plastic overflows during compilation. So far, nvcc povides no such similar compiler option for dealing with undefined behaviors. In addition, due to the proprietary nature of CUDA platform, it is also currently infeasible to extend the functionality of the nvcc compiler.
To address these issues, we first convert CUDA code to normal C/C++ code by performing syntax-and semanticsconserving transformations. Then, based on the LLVM framework, we develop a static checker to perform in depth analysis on the transformed code to recognize the vulnerable code that can potentially result in undefined behaviors. In this way, we can not only avoid the complexities of realizing undefined behavior detection directly in the nvcc compiler, but also leverage a wide range of functionalities offered by LLVM.
VI. SYSTEM DESIGN
From Section IV we know that some compilers often take radical optimizations (discarding vulnerable code) when undefined behaviors are encountered. But the consequences are often confusing to the programmer. Our goal is to find and pinpoint these vulnerable code snippets in CUDA C, and then throw warnings to programmers, instead of having the compiler remove it silently. In order to achieve the goal of identifying vulnerable code, it is required that our method can filter out well-defined code and other error-causing code. Our system consists of two parts, one is the converter named COVT that transforms CUDA code to normal C code, and the other is the static checker based on stack [5] that detects the vulnerable code by imitating an aggressive compiler.
A. OVERVIEW
As aforementioned, the CUDA platform is proprietary, and it is not straightforward to implement extensions for the nvcc compiler. To address this challenge, we designed a converter, which supports a subset of the CUDA run-time APIs and device-kernel language. It provides a C-compatible run-time API, C-compatible kernel-launch mechanism, C++ kernel language, pointer-based memory management, and most data structures (covtStream_t, covtEvent_t) are typedefs to CUDA equivalents. Another challenge is how to avoid reporting false warnings for vulnerable code, which is generated by the compiler rather than written by the programmer. As shown in FIGURE 1, COVT is the first step in the system workflow and is a prerequisite for ensuring the next several steps. The user can use a script at the console to convert CUDA C programs that can only be compiled on the CUDA platform into portable C/C++ programs that can be compiled by C/C++ compilers, such as gcc, clang etc. When the conversion is completed, the second step is to use another script to call clang to compile the transformed C/C++ code into LLVM intermediate representation (IR). The operations in remaining steps are all based on the LLVM IR.
In the third step, undefined behavior conditions shown in Table 1 are inserted into the IR. In the fourth step, we use a solver-based recognition algorithm described in the stack to accurately locate vulnerable code fragments. In the final step, our system produces a report that contains related information about the detected undefined behavior, such as the location of vulnerable code, to the programmer.
B. DESIGN OF THE CONVERTER
Because a CUDA program consists of two parts: the host side and the device side, we define a keyword __clang__ in COVT to identify the currently compiled pass: host or device. In COVT, we define a set of C++ runtime API and kernel language in header files to assist the code transformation. There are two main header files: covt_runtime.h and covt_runtime_api.h. In these two header files, we define multiple dictionaries that map CUDA specific types, functions to corresponding COVT types and functions, which provide the same signature as originally defined in CUDA to maintain consistent behaviors in the translated program. For example, we define functions like covtMalloc, covtMemcpy, and covtFree, which are respectively corresponding to cudaMalloc, cudaMemcpy, and cudaFree in CUDA.
To demonstrate its usage, consider the following code snippet that is vulnerable. It is in transformed form using COVT APIs. These APIs have the same signature as in CUDA, hence, the converted program has the same functionality as the original implementation. We use the covtLaunchKernel macro instead of cudaLaunchKernel, and the foo_kernel is replaced with foo_covtLaunchKernel. In addition, these header files also contain almost all inline functions, so the transformed program would not incur much overhead on compiling time. The headers are in the form of user-defined extern functions, so the converted code can be compiled using compilers that follow the C++ 11 standard.
1) WORKFLOW OF THE CONVERTER
COVT first scans each source file (cpp,c, cu, h, hpp, etc.) to determine if the file contains CUDA code. If so, an abstract syntax tree (AST) is generated by the parser. The AST reflects the syntactical structure of the code in a tree structure. Each node in the tree represents a language construct, such as a FIGURE 2. The workflow of the converter. The converter consists of three steps (represented with numbers) to transform CUDA C into portable C/C++ by modifying the AST, ''1'' denotes querying the map if there are any objects to replace; ''2'' denotes replacing the functions related to CUDA C, and ''3'' denotes rewriting the program. keyword or an expression. Because AST is an intermediate form of the program, so it can be easily annotated/manipulated with information about the program and can be used to check other semantic information. Therefore, by traversing the AST, we can identify the CUDA related syntax, and replace the keywords/functions in CUDA C program with corresponding COVT definitions. After the keyword replacement, COVT generates the transformed source code with the modified AST. These codes can be compiled with clang as described in Section VI.
As shown in Figure 2 , the system first queries the Map to determine if it contains the objects that can be replaced, if true, the map will use corresponding objects to perform replacement. Then, the system rewrites the program based on the modified AST. The Map contains all CUDA functions, such as cudaMalloc, cudaMemcpy etc, and it tells the system which corresponding functions to replace. During the process of transformation, the converter does not change the data types that are stored in the AST, such as strings, characters, integers, floating-point numbers, identifiers etc.
We know that the vector type is derived from the basic integer and floating-point types, the first, second, third and fourth components of a vector are accessible through the field of x, y, z and w respectively. In the converter, we use a constructor function of the form make_(type_name)() to create the vector type of CUDA C. For example, make_int4(intx, inty, intz, intw) creates a vector of type int4 and its value is (x, y, z, w). Because our system only focuses on discovering undefined behaviors, and performance is not our first concern, for the type dim3 appearing in CUDA programs, we uniformly set it to 1. For the function cudaLaunchKernel, we assign 1 grid and 12 threads to the program uniformly. Although this may cause performance degradation, the end results would not be affected.
For read/write operations without a particular sequence, the converter guarantees that the order can be maintained after the conversion based on the AST. Consider the following code. Because multiple writes to the same location must be ordered, but the operands in the addition have an unspecified evaluation order. After transformation, its evaluation order is not changed. Thus, if a program that may cause undefined behaviors because of the read-write sequence is transformed, its potential vulnerabilities are reserved. In the following, we present a formalization about the code conversion. COVT uses an approach that a concrete program correctly implements its corresponding abstract program to prove the behavioral consistency. Here, an abstract program uses some abstract data types such as set, list, map, and the operations upon those data types. In order to extract the abstract program, let program B be the refinement of program A, which means that B should satisfy any protocol that A satisfies. That is, in any context, B can replace A.
Using coupling invariant I , the refinement condition can be expressed in the following form.
wp(A, T ) ∧ I ⇒ wp(B, ¬wp(A, ¬I ))
Coupling invariant I describes the relationship between the variables in A and B, and this expression indicates that for any execution of B whose initial condition satisfies the coupling invariant I , there is an angelic execution of A, and the final state of I in A and B is still true. If the procedure A is deterministic, this refinement condition can be simplified to the following form.
wp(A, T ) ⇒ wp(assumeI ; B; A; assertI ; T )
For example, consider the two code snippets below. Assume that they represent programs A and B respectively. Their coupling invariant I is x < 10, and T is a parameter of the module, which is used as an encapsulation mechanism to tie together a set of declarations of variables and operations upon them, such as intx = 0 and x + +. Assume A denotes a CUDA program, B denotes its abstract program, and C denotes the corresponding converted program. COVT extracts the abstract program B of A with refining relationship, if B can satisfy any protocol that A satisfies, we consider it a correct abstract. Then, we use it to verify the consistency of C. If the verification proves to be ture, we consider C a dialect of A, the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
In addition, to ensure the correctness of the converted program, we need to retain the granularity of the program in atomic operations. For example, in the following code snippet, the two threads of lower program are each equivalent to the corresponding thread of the above program, but the entire lower program is not a refinement of the above program. Assuming x has an initial value of 0, we know that the value of x can only be 2 after the execution of the above program (here we assume that x++ is executed by the atom, ie, its execution cannot be interrupted), while the lower program will generate two possible results: 1 and 2. 
C. THE STATIC CHECKER
In order to identify the vulnerable code, we adopt the approach proposed in stack [5] , which uses a two-phase scheme to identify the code that contains undefined behaviors. 1. By taking advantage of undefined behaviors, it identifies the vulnerable statements in program P, and 2. identifies the vulnerable expressions that can be optimized into a simpler form. Concretely, we first navigate to statements or expressions that are similar to undefined conditions, and then determine if they can trigger undefined behaviors in the program. We know that when the program starts compiling, the AST of the program is established, and based on the AST we can get the values of key variables contained in statements. By comparing with the key values that are defined in behavior conditions, we can further confirm if these positioned statements would result in undefined behaviors.
For example, for an expression x/y, after calculating the similarity of this statement, the system searches AST for the storage address of variable y to get its value. If the value of y matches the key value y = 0 in undefined conditions, then the system determines if the statement can cause undefined behaviors to occur.
The built-in functionality of path-sensitive analysis in clang is leveraged to perform code examination, and the checker is mounted on the symbol execution engine of clang to analyze program statements and report errors. This approach makes it easy for us to extend code checking rules or bug types.
In path-sensitive analysis, clang uses two sets named visited and visitedastoplevel in clang to store the functions that are inline analyzed, then the functions are analyzed in the order of caller and callee. If we find that the current function has been parsed through inline, it will be skipped directly by the checkers. If it has not been parsed, call Handlecode (a function to handle code in clang) for Am_path (an interface for code analysis based on sensitive paths in clang) code analysis, and finally add the parsed code to the visited collection. As shown in the Figure 3 , the functions A, B, and C are scanned sequentially. For example, function E in the figure has been inlined during the analysis of A, then it will no longer be parsed, which means that our checker will ignores function E for detection. Consider the above code. A division-by-zero error would be reported when there is only one function foo() in the code, but when the code is changed to the form which contains foo() and bar(), no error will be reported again. Because the topology sequence is used for the analysis of functions in CallGraph (the graph of function calls), the analysis first parses the function bar(), and then parses the function foo(). When bar() calls foo(), the statement if(len < 10) will fail to branch, so the statement j = 42/i would not been executed. In order to avoid this kind of omission, our system will re-analyze the functions that have been skipped because of inline analysis after the first stage of function traversal.
D. THE COMPILER FRONTEND
In this step, our system intercepts invocations to gcc and calls clang to compile the converted C++ program into LLVM IR, which will be used in the remaining stages. Furthermore, in order to find vulnerable code across different functions, we invoke LLVM to inline these functions. A challenge is to avoid reporting false warnings for unstable code that is generated by the compiler itself, consider such a code snippet below. Here, p denotes a pointer passed from the caller, but the programmers simply reuse the macro IS_A, instead of directly writing the null pointer check. As far as we know, this results in a lot of C-family compilers generating false warnings to users. When our system checks this code snippet, it considers the code to be vulnerable due to earlier dereference p− > tag, because it works on individual functions.
To avoid such false warnings generated by the compiler, we record the value of variables in the original macro definition during the IR preprocessing and editing by implementing a clang plugin. For bug reports generated during this process or the reports of the vulnerable code, our system use these information to avoid generating false reports from compilers.
E. UB CONDITION INSERTION
In order to identify the vulnerable code, we use the UB condition to make the decision. For each UB condition listed in Table 1 , our system inserts a special function call into the LLVM IR at the corresponding instruction: voidub_on(boolexpr). This function takes one boolean parameter as the UB condition.
During the process of detecting undefined behaviors, if a code fragment matches one kind of UB conditions, our system believes that the code fragment is vulnerable and further analyzes the vulnerable code in the next step through recording the key values of variables. For example, consider the null pointer dereference * p, we insert ub_on(p = NULL) for it, and then use the ub_on call to evaluate the assumption about well-defined programs [5] .
F. BOOLEAN INTERPRETER
We know that a program consists of statements and expressions, for the goal of precisely identifying the vulnerable code in program, we should decide whether a statement is unreachable or an expression can be simplified by unnecessary calculations. To solve this problem, we used two algorithms proposed by Stack [5] : the first one is the elimination algorithm, which can be used to identify unstable statements that can be eliminated; the second one is The simplification algorithm, which can be used to identify unstable expressions that can be optimized into a simpler form. For every query, the Boolector solver is used to tell the Checker whether a detected code snippet satisfies for elimination or simplification, and then compare with the key values defined in the behavior conditions to confirm if these positioned statements or expression can result in undefined behaviors.
G. BUG REPORT
When undefined behaviors are found, the system reports a warning to the programmer. However, instead of throwing a warning message that only contains the bug type, more detailed information such as bug location are reported, since the system first needs to convert CUDA C program before detection, and it is difficult to accurately locate the bug in the original CUDA C program. To solve this issue, we use a counter to record the code lines of corresponding statements and expressions when performing code conversion. TABLE 3. The bugs identified by our system, ''div'' denotes division by zero, ''shift'' denotes oversized shift, ''null'' denotes null pointer dereference, ''integer'' denotes signed integer overflow, ''array'' denotes an array object and integer type produces a result that points just beyond the array object and is used as the operand of a unary * operator that is evaluated.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the practicality of our system with a set of real CUDA applications. From the experimental results, we can see that our system achieves the desired functionality of detecting undefined behaviors. It can not only correctly transform CUDA C programs, but also accurately identify vulnerable code, and ultimately determine whether the identified vulnerable code would result in undefined behaviors or not.
In order to show the effectiveness of our system, we tested all the examples in CUDA SDK (version 7.5), and found a wide range of undefined behaviors. For example, our system detected out-of-bounds array access in binomiacoptions (in directory 4_Finance), null pointer reference in Band-widthTest (in directory 1_Utilities), oversized shifting in bilateralFilter (3_Imaging), division by zero in bindlessTexture (in directory 2_Graphics), and so on. In addition, we also intentionally modified some parameters of vulnerable code snippet so that they can meet the conditions that result in undefined behaviors. For the test programs without modified parameters, our system does not throw out any warnings and errors. In contrast, for the modified programs, our system throws out warnings to indicate potential undefined behaviors, and reports concrete types and code lines.
Besides the CUDA SDK examples, we also conducted extensive analysis on real GPU applications written in CUDA C and C/C++. The systems analyzed are listed in Table 3 , including ElasticTusion [16] , Gunrock [17] , Frog [18] , CuSha [19] , Totem [20] , Medusa [21] , Parbiol benchmark [22] , Rodinina benchmark [23] , GPUnet [24] , and celebrandil [25] . With our system, we found a variable types of vulnerable code including division by zero, oversized shift, signed integer overflow, out-of-range pointer, and null pointer dereference. In the rest of this section, we present these detected vulnerable code fragments to illustrate how undefined behaviors are introduced in real CUDA applications.
A. DIVISION BY ZERO
We first present the implementation of a 64-bit signed division operator [26] for stopping incomplete model images from making up colors in ElasticTusion. See the code snippet below. This code shows the distortion of image caused by data overflow. In the definition of this function, the variable sum and count is of type float and type int respectively. Their initial values are both 0. In expression sum/(float)count, count is first converted to float type, and then it is divided by sum. When the input value of the variable count is 0, although it is converted to a float type, this expression would produce an overflow, leading to undefined behaviors. The developer of this program may incorrectly ignore the possibility that the value of count can be 0 and assumes that the quotient must be within the range of values that type double can express. Unlike gcc and clang, nvcc does not check division by zero during compilation, which results in undefined behaviors at runtime.
In the process of detecting undefined behavior, our system first queries all the undefined conditions shown in the Table 1 , then it uses the sufficient condition of division-by-zero to determine if the expression has the possibility to satisfy the condition of triggering undefined behaviors.
B. OVERSIZED SHIFTING
Consider the following code snippet from the Parboil benchmark, which atomically increments an element of the array smem in shared memory. This code snippet shows an example that contains oversized shifting shown in Table 1 . It first defines the variable add with type unsignedint and converts the value of 1 << offset to the type unsignedint before it assigns the value to add. Then it uses atomicAdd to atomically increment an element in the shared memory. These operations seem to have no problems on the surface, and the program is actually effective. However, even if the final value of 1 << offset is converted to type unsignedint, when the value of offset is greater than 32, the expression would produce an overflowed value and may directly invoke undefined behaviors.
Our system identifies this code snippet as vulnerable. During the process of detecting undefined behaviors, the checker first queries all the undefined conditions that are inserted in the stage described in section VI, then it uses the elimination algorithm to decide whether this code fragment has the possibility to satisfy the condition of triggering oversized shifting. After analysis, our system reported this vulnerability.
C. NULL POINTER DEREFERENCE
The optimizer in a modern compiler has a number of operations that run in a specified order (sometimes these optimized operations are circulative), and these operations keep pace with things like version upgrades. In addition, different compilers also contain quite different optimizers. Because optimization operation occurs at different stages, the optimization of the previous change code may lead to new results in the following stages. Consider the above code snippet from Frog. In this example, the program clearly performs checking for NULL pointers, and if the compiler happens to eliminate dead code before eliminating the redundant NULL-Check, the code is likely to be transformed into the form shown below (it only happens in gcc, both clang and nvcc has abandoned this optimization). For many programmers, it is amazing to remove NULL from this function (maybe they submit a compiler bug). This happens all the time during the inline process.
After function inlining, a bunch of optimization opportunities are often exposed to the second round. This means that if the optimizer decides to inline a function, all kinds of locality optimization can take advantage of it and change the behavior of the code. This is not only standard, but also important to performance.
By identifying vulnerable code, our system is also useful for uncovering programming bugs that do not directly invoke undefined behaviors. The above code snippet shows an incorrect null pointer check from the Frog, the code dereferences t via t− > part_num, and only performs the validation afterward. Given a null t, it is expected that this null-check-afterdereference bug would return an error code due to the null pointer check, this is considered a serious vulnerability. Our system identifies the check as vulnerable code, because under the no-pointer-overflow assumption t must be non-null. overflow would occur. In C/C++, although C-family compilers provide −fno − * family of optimization options, e.g., −fno − strict − overflow, which means that overflow is undefined when doing arithmetic with signed numbers and the compiler may assume signed integer overflow does not happen. Thus, this optimization option always results in compilers dealing with signed integer overflow by themselves. At present, no production compilers discard this option in the optimization level. Like many C-family compilers, nvcc also can not currently optimize this, but our system identifies the check as vulnerable code. The above code fragment is from Gunrock. When compiling it with nvcc at optimization levels, the compilation time increases significantly as compared to common compilation level. With strict aliasing, the compiler is able to conclude that updating parameter− > src[i] does not change parameter− > iterations, because they are different types, and thus moves the load of parameter− > iterations out of the loop. However, at common compilation level, the compiler has to generate code that reloads parameter− > iterations in each iteration. If we add a variable to hold it before entering the loop, the abnormal compilation time disappears.
E. OUT-OF-RANGE POINTER
From Section III, we know that compilers usually assume that the value of a pointer will never be out of range. However, when it is not the case, the program's behavior is undefined. Consider such a code snippet from Frog. The original intention of the programmer is to check if arrays v1 and v2 have the same first n elements. Usually this is plausible, but if v1 and v2 contain different numbers of elements and the programmer does not perform boundary checking on the arrays, it will risk of an out-of-bounds accessing error and results in undefined behaviors. Some compilers may throw errors or warnings and terminate compilation, but others may do not perform this kind of check.
F. PERFORMANCE
To evaluate the performance of our system, we measure the runtime of analyzing the benchmarks listed in Table 4 , using their latest versions. The experiments were conducted on a 64-bit Ubuntu-14.04 Linux machine with an Intel E5-2603V3 1.6 GHz CPU. The processor has 6 cores with hyper-threading enabled.
Our system converted, built and analyzed each package using 36 processes in parallel and we set a timeout of 6 seconds for each query to the solver (including computing the UB condition set as described in Section VI). Table 1 shows the transform time, build time, analysis time, the number of files and total queries to the solver. The results indicate that our system can finish analyzing a benchmark within an acceptable amount of time.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Several research groups have conducted the detection of undefined behavior for C, including Wang et al. [5] , Memarian et al. [27] , Hathhorn et al. [8] , Ellison et al. [28] , Kang et al. [29] , Nagarakatte et al. [30] , Brown et al. [31] , and Chisnall et al. [32] . We divide these works into two categories, one is based on static analysis and the other is based on semantics. The main difference with our work is that we are principally concerned with undefined behaviors in CUDA C, which has not been investigated in previous work to the best of our knowledge.
A. STATIC ANALYSIS BASED APPROACHES
Stack [5] is a representative system for the detection of undefined behaviors for C/C++ based on static analysis. It proposes a new model for the identification of unstable code. It was applied to a wide range of systems and uncovered 160 new bugs. The other typical representative system are based on drastically incomplete language grammars (''microgrammars'') that describe only portions of a language relevant to a checker, this kind of checker is implemented in a language-agnostic framework for writing static bug checkers. With it, Brown et al. [31] built micro-grammar based checkers for six languages, such as C, the C preprocessor, C++, Java, JavaScript, and Dart, and finally they found over 700 errors in real-world projects.
B. SEMANTICS BASED APPROACHES K [8] Framework is a system based on semantics to detect undefined behaviors in C. The authors investigated each undefined behavior in C, including a discussion of various semantic techniques and considerations needed to capture all the core language undefinedness. This work proposes the design of a semantics-based undefinedness checker, which is the most comprehensive semantic treatment of undefinedness in C. For identifying unstable code, it allows a compiler to generate precise warnings when it removes code based on undefined behavior. The framework is capable of detecting all 77 categories of core language undefinedness defined in C11 standard.
Memarian et al. [27] presents an in-depth analysis of the design space for the semantics of pointers and memory in C, and a formal semantics named Cerberus, which is used to capture the ISO text for these aspects as clearly as possible. The authors applied the analysis to a C dialect supported by some processors that implement unforgeable and bounds-checked C pointers.
Dillig et al. [33] propose that inconsistency inference is best understood as a variant of the better understood problem of type inference. Based on this insight, they describe a precise and formal framework for discovering inconsistency errors. Their technique for finding inconsistency errors is purely semantic and can deal with complex aliasing and path-sensitive conditions. The evaluation results on a number of open source applications show that semantic inconsistency checking can uncover a large number of previously undiscovered errors.
Kang et al. [29] present a quasi-concrete model that fully supports integer-pointer casts and yet allows C/C++ standard compiler optimizations. Simon et al. [32] analyze the ways in which compiler optimizations break implicit properties of crypto code and add some guarantees for two of these properties (the ways in which compiler optimization breaks implicit properties of crypto code) in clang/LLVM. A few of C interpreters such as kcc [28] and Frama-C [34] perform checks for undefined behaviors; IOC [13] that is a part of clang's sanitizers and Kint [35] have found many integer errors.
C. COMPILER'S BUILT-IN FUNCTIONALITY
Currently, clang provides several options to check certain types of undefined behaviors in C/C++, such as −fsanitize = bounds (used for checking out-of-bounds array indexing in cases where the array bound can be statically determined), −fsanitize = float − divide − by −zero (used for checking division-by-zero), −fsanitize = null (use of a null pointer or creation of a null reference), −fsanitize = signed − integer − overflow (signed integer overflow, where the result of a signed integer computation cannot be represented in its type), and −fsanitize = shift (shift operators where the amount shifted is greater or equal to the promoted bit-width of the left hand side or less than zero, or where the left hand side is negative). These options can help programmers reduce some surprising optimizations, but this usually results in compilers producing slower code. At the same time, the functionalities of the checkers is incomplete (e.g., no options for an object defined with a volatile-qualified type). In CUDA C, nvcc has only one option (-sp-bound-check) to generate stack-pointer bounds-checking code.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a system that specifically targets the detection of undefined behaviors in CUDA C programs, and the evaluation demonstrates the existence of undefined behaviors in real GPU applications and the capability of our system in identifying undefined behaviors. Our system can accurately locate vulnerable code with the help of a code conversion and vulnerability detection mechanism. Since the UB conditions are not complete, our system currently can not detect some types of undefined behavior. However, we believe that it is straightforward to extend our system to include more conditions, which will be conducted in our future work.
